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Abstract. The security of a deterministic quantum scheme for communication, namely the
LM05 [1], is studied in presence of a lossy channel under the assumption of imperfect generation
and detection of single photons. It is shown that the scheme allows for a rate of distillable secure
bits higher than that pertaining to BB84 [2]. We report on a first implementation of LM05 with
weak pulses.
1. Introduction
Deterministic quantum schemes (DQS) for secure communication have recently
gained interest and diffusion in the field of quantum cryptography [3, 1], and their
first experimental ‘proofs of principle’ have been already completed [4, 5]. Despite
the main achievement of a secure direct communication (A. Beige et al. in [3] )
is still quite far, DQS can provide better security and higher transmission rates
in the quantum key distribution (QKD) process than traditional schemes like the
BB84 [2].
One of these DQS, namely the LM05 [1], saturates the Holevo bound for
QKD [6], and is quite practical to implement as it does not require entangle-
ment to work [5]. The security of LM05 against eavesdropping in case the users
(Alice and Bob) are endowed with a perfect equipment was discussed in [1]. Specif-
ically LM05 results robust against a general eavesdropping on a noisy but lossless
channel, and explicit thresholds were given in case of individual attacks by the
eavesdropper (Eve); furthermore a particular strategy by Eve on a noisy and lossy
channel as described in [7] was also deemed as detectable by legitimate users.
In this work we relax the hypothesis of perfect equipment for Alice and Bob.
We take as photon source an attenuated laser that produces weak pulses; these
pulses can accidentally (and uncontrollably) contain more than one photon. Fur-
thermore Bob’s detectors are avalanche photodiodes (APD) that either ‘click’ or
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‘not click’, without counting the exact number of photons in the pulse, and have
nonunitary quantum efficiency and nonzero dark counts probability. It has been
shown that the conjunction of imperfect devices with a lossy channel jeopardizes
the security of QKD [8]. The main threat is represented by a photon-number
splitting attack (PNS) in which an almighty Eve exploits the multiphoton pulses
to acquire information, whilst concealing her presence behind the expected losses-
rate [9, 10, 11]. PNS attacks are currently the main limitation to a long-distance
BB84 realized with weak pulses [12, 13].
The paper is organized as follows. In section I we review the LM05 protocol
and describe the PNS attacks against it. In section II we theoretically study the
security against these attacks in terms of the rate of distillable secure bits. In
section III we describe the first experimental test of LM05 with weak pulses.
2. Theory
The LM05 protocol works as follows [1]. Bob prepares a photon in one of the
four polarization states |0〉, |1〉, |±〉 = 1/√2 (|0〉 ± |1〉), with |0〉, |1〉 eigenstates of
the Pauli operator σ̂z, and sends it to Alice. With probability c Alice measures the
photon (control mode, CM) as she would do in the BB84 protocol. This guarantees
that the scheme is at least as secure as the BB84. Otherwise, with probability 1−c,
she uses the photon to encode a bit (message mode, MM) by flipping (logical value
‘1’) or not flipping (logical value ‘0’) it. After that she sends the photon back to
Bob. To flip the photon without knowing its state Alice uses the operation iσ̂y,
that acts as a universal ‘equatorial NOT’ gate [14]. Bob can deterministically
decode Alice’s message by measuring the qubit in the same basis he prepared it,
without demand for a classical channel. We point out that LM05 does not allow for
a direct communication when the channel is noisy or lossy. As explained in [15] it
is not possible so far to achieve both a reliable and secure delivery of a message: if
one uses the error correction protocol [16, 17] to make the communication reliable
Eve can capture a non negligible amount of information, while if one uses the
privacy amplification protocol [18] to make the communication secure Bob has
no means to reconstruct Alice’s original message. Whether a secure and reliable
direct communication in presence of noise or losses is really possible is still an open
question.
In the following we describe two PNS attacks, that provide full information to
Eve while remaining completely undetected. Notwithstanding the analysis includes
also strategies of the same kind that are only partially informative to Eve: with
privacy amplification [18] Alice and Bob can remove any remaining information
from Eve, according to what explained in [12].
When the photon source is a laser attenuated with an average photon number
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per pulse µ, the probability to have n photons in a single pulse is given by [19]:
Pn (µ) =
µn
n!
e−µ. (1)
A typical value used for µ in the experiments is 0.1 that gives P0 ≃ 9 · 10−1, P1 ≃
9 ·10−2, P2 ≃ 4.5 ·10−2 , and so on. This means that with a probability Pn (µ) Bob
prepares the state
|ψ〉⊗n =
|ψ〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ψ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
(2)
rather than the desired state |ψ〉 (ψ indicates one of the four polarizations of the
photon prepared by Bob).
It is known (Lutkenhaus’s suggestion in [20]) that when n = 3 it exists a mea-
surement M that provides a conclusive result about the absolute polarization ψ
with (optimal) probability 1/2. Eve can exploit this fact to eavesdrop on LM05
protocol in the following way. She performs a quantum nondemolition measure-
ment (QND) on the pulses as soon as they exit Bob’s station; this can be done
without perturbing the polarization ψ. When she finds n < 3 she blocks the pulses.
On the pulses with at least three photons she executesM and if the outcome is not
conclusive she blocks these pulses as well. When n ≥ 3 and the outcome of M is
conclusive she prepares a new photon in the right state ψ and forwards it to Alice.
Until here this attack is completely analogous to the ‘IRUD-attack’ described in
[20]. The only variant is that Eve waits for Alice encoding and measures again the
photon on the backward trip, to know whether it has been flipped (in this case
she finds the orthogonal state
∣∣ψ⊥〉) or not (she finds |ψ〉). Since Eve did know ψ,
she can extract Alice’s information without perturbing the state. After that she
forwards the photon in the correct state to Bob. We call this first attack PNSM.
A second attack is more peculiar to LM05. This time suppose that n = 2
and call the two photons in the pulse p1 and p2. As before Eve can know the
number of photons per pulse through a QND measure. When n < 2 Eve blocks
the pulses. When n = 2 she stores p1 and forwards p2 to Alice; this let her
remain undetected during a possible CM on the forward path. On the way back
Eve captures again p2. To gain Alice’s information she must decide whether the
polarizations of p1 and p2 are parallel or antiparallel: in the first case she would
deduce the logical value ‘0’; in the second case she would deduce ‘1’. But the
discrimination between parallel and antiparallel spins is not as simple as it appears
at a first glimpse: while the parallel-spin-state |P 〉 = |ψ〉p1 |ψ〉p2 is symmetric, the
antiparallel-spin-state |AP 〉 = |ψ〉p1 |ψ⊥〉p2 is neither symmetric nor antisymmetric.
Upon symmetrizing |AP 〉 we can realize that it is not orthogonal to |P 〉, and by
consequence it is not perfectly distinguishable from it (we remand to [21], [22] for
a complete treatment of this problem). Actually an optimal measurement M′ is
a nonlocal one and gives Eve a conclusive result (between |P 〉 and |AP 〉) with a
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probability 1/4 [21]. Hence Eve can block all the ‘inconclusive’ pulses to gain full
information and still remain undetected. However it remains open the question
of which photon must Eve forward to Bob. The measurement M′ consists in a
generalized measurement with projectors in the four-dimensional Hilbert space
given by: Πp1,p2A = [|ψ〉|ψ⊥〉 − |ψ⊥〉|ψ〉] ⊗ [〈ψ|〈ψ⊥| − 〈ψ⊥|〈ψ|]/2 and Πp1,p2S =
I4 − Πp1,p2A . The conclusive answer is related to the antisymmetric state Πp1,p2A .
Upon obtaining this result Eve does not know whether to give Bob the state |ψ〉 or
the state |ψ⊥〉, because she ignores the absolute value of ψ prepared by Bob. This
shows that two photons are not sufficient for a perfect eavesdropping with M′.
Yet the complete attack can be accomplished with an additional photon p3: Eve
should store p3, execute M′, and eventually encode p3 according to the conclusive
outcome ofM′; the photon prepared in this way can be forwarded to Bob without
risk of detection.
The above analysis establishes that a perfect (i.e. with zero QBER) eavesdrop-
ping can be realized with at least three photons in a pulse. It also establishes that
the measurement M represents a more powerful resource for Eve than M′, for a
number of reasons: it gives information on the complete polarization state ψ of
the photons, not only on Alice’s operation; the probability of conclusive results
is 1/2 rather than 1/4; Eve knows about the conclusiveness of her measurement
immediately, rather than after Alice’s encoding, and can use this information to
improve her strategy. For these reasons hereafter we only study the robustness of
the scheme against the PNSM attacks. We do it following Lu¨tkenhaus’s approach
in [12].
Bob prepares photons with a phase-averaged weak-pulse laser; the statistics of
the photons in each pulse is described by Eq.(1). Given a forward-and-backward
lossy channel with transmissivity tlink, and with reference to the MM runs of
the protocol, we see that the encoded photons are revealed by Bob’s APDs with
average probability:
psignav = 1− e−µηB tlink ≃ µηBtlink, (3)
where the approximation is valid for small values of the exponent. ηB is the
quantum efficiency of Bob’s detectors; tlink = 10
−(αl+Γc)/10 is the transmissivity
of the channel, where α is the absorption coefficient [23], l is the distance (in Km)
between the place in which the photon is prepared and the place in which it is
detected, and Γc is a constant total loss-rate given by Alice’s encoding equipment
and Bob’s measuring apparatus. To the signal revealed by Bob contribute also the
dark counts per gating windows, dB , from his (two) detectors: p
dark
av = 2dB , for a
total signal probability equal to
pav = p
sign
av + p
dark
av − psignav pdarkav , (4)
where the last term represents the probability of a coincidence between a dark
count and a true signal photon. Now we can write the necessary condition for
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security against the PNSM attacks as:
pav > P˜ =
1
2
Pn=3 (µ) + Pn>3 (µ) = 1−
(
1 + µ+
µ2
2
+
1
2
µ3
6
)
e−µ (5)
In Eq.(5) we conservatively assumed that the probability of a conclusive outcome
from M for more than three photons in a single pulse is 1. The meaning of the
above formula is that when the loss-rate is too high the probability to detect a
signal photon becomes smaller and smaller, eventually letting Eve conceal under
the expected losses. In Fig.1 we plotted the logarithm of the difference (psignav − P˜ ),
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Fig. 1: Secure rate versus transmittance for the protocols LM05 (continuous line)
and BB84 (dotted line) with the following parameters: µ = 1, ηB = 1, Γc = 0.
The ‘secure rate’ is defined by (psignav − P˜ ) for LM05 and by (psignav −P ∗) for BB84.
See text for the explicit expressions of psignav , P˜ and P ∗.
that defines the security region of LM05, versus the transmittance of the channel
tlink, after setting µ = 1, ηB = 1 and Γc = 0. We also plotted the analogous curve
for BB84 under the same settings. The purpose is to show for which values of tlink
the two protocols are secure against PNS attacks. It can be noted that despite the
quite high value of µ the security of LM05 is attained for almost all the values of
tlink. In order to reduce the probability on the right side of Eq.(5) and increase
the security of the scheme we could decrease the value of µ; however in this way
also the probability to detect a signal (Eq.(3)) will decrease. So there must be a
tradeoff between these two opposite requirements (security and signal rate) that
defines an optimality region for the scheme.
The tradeoff can be studied through the ‘gain of secure bits’ defined in [12],
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that we rewrite here for LM05 protocol:
Gsec = pav
[
β(1 − τ ′)− fcasch (e)
]
; τ ′ = τ (e/β) . (6)
It represents the fraction of secure bits that can be distilled from the transmitted
bits after the procedures of error correction [16, 17] and privacy amplification [18].
β = (pav − P˜ )/pav > 0 is the security parameter: until it is positive the protocol
is secure against PNSM attacks. fcasc is a function defined in [17] that takes into
account the imperfect (although efficient) error correction procedure performed
with the Cascade protocol; h (e) is the Shannon entropy for the QBER e; τ is
the fraction of the error-corrected key which has to be discarded during privacy
amplification when only single-photon pulses are taken into account [25]; it is a
function of the QBER and amounts to [26]: τ(e) = log2(1+4e−4e2) for 0 ≤ e ≤ 1/2
and τ(e) = 1 for 1/2 < e ≤ 1. Finally τ ′ in Eq.(6) represents the fraction of bits to
discard after taking into account multiphoton pulses: it amounts to τ scaled with
the security parameter β. The QBER e is given by the experiment according to
the following expression e = (nerr +nD/2)/ntot, where nerr is the number of error
bits in the sifted key, nD is the number of ‘ambiguous’ double clicks in Bob’s APDs
and ntot is the total number of used bits. The importance of nD is theoretical:
usually nD ≪ nerr, and it can be completely neglected.
In Fig.2 the gain Gsec for both LM05 (continuous lines) and BB84 (dotted
lines) is plotted as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob. We note
that when Alice-Bob distance is l the total distance between the creation of the
photon and its final detection is l for the BB84, and 2l for the LM05, due to the
double usage of the quantum channel. The BB84 implementation we adopted for
comparison with LM05 is the one reported in Ref. [24] for the first optical fiber
communication window at wavelength around 0.8µm. It is worthwhile noting that
the secure gain has a maximum in µ for every fixed length l. Hence the pictures in
Fig.2 have been obtained by fixing four values of l (l1 = 1.5, l2 = 3, l3 = 4.5, l4 = 6
Km respectively plot a, b, c, d) both for LM05 and BB84, and finding the values
µi that provide a maximum for Gsec (µi|li). We allowed µi to be different in BB84
and LM05. Vertical lines have been drawn at the typical distances li (i = 1, ...4).
The maximum distance for both the protocols is between 6 and 7 Km for the
parameters given in the caption of Fig.2. It can be seen that in correspondence
of the vertical lines l1, l2, l3 (plots a, b, c) the LM05 curves are above the BB84
curves, while it is the opposite for l4 (plot d). This means that for almost all the
relevant distances between Alice and Bob, the LM05 allows for a better gain of
secure bits, that directly reflects in higher distribution rates of secure bits between
the users. The improvement on small and medium distances has two reasons: the
first is the deterministic nature of the protocol, that doubles the rate by removing
the basis reconciliation procedure; this reflects in a factor 2 for Gsec pertaining to
LM05 respect to that pertaining to BB84 [12]. The second reason is the two-way
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Fig. 2: Secure rate vs Alice-Bob distance given the PNS attacks described in the
text. λ = 830 nm, α = 2.5 dB/Km, Γc = 8 dB, dB = 5 × 10−8 counts/slot,
ηB = 0.5.
channel, that provides the probability P˜ of Eq.(5) considerably smaller than the
analogous of BB84, given by P ∗ = Pn≥2 (µ) = 1−(1 + µ) e−µ. It should be noticed
that the same double channel also implies a higher total loss-rate for LM05; then
the increased gain of secure bits is a non trivial result.
3. Experiment
The experimental test of LM05 for QKD is realized exploiting non-orthogonal
polarization states of near infrared photons (see Fig.3).
The photon source is a pulsed diode laser (Picoquant PDL 808) at 810nm with
a repetition rate of 20MHz, pulse width 88ps FWHM. A pulse generator is used
as sync source for the laser diode and a detection circuit. The light pulses are first
split in two, one half goes at Bob’s side for the initial state preparation for both
CM and MM runs, the other half is sent to Alice for the CM runs.
The first stage of the protocol is the preparation at Bob’s side of the qubits,
encoded using a λ/2 waveplate (P1), in four polarization linear states of the light
pulses attenuated to an average number of photons per pulse of µ = (0.118 ±
0.002). The prepared photons are launched into 5m long single mode fibers at
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Fig. 3: Experimental setup (see text for details). Inset – a typical communica-
tion test for different sets of preparation by Bob and operation by Alice. Bobs
preparation is reported on the overlay (σ̂z and σ̂x eigenstates). Alices encoding
is represented by the lighter gray area for I (logical ‘0’), and darker gray for iσ̂y
(logical ‘1’). The black area represents the distribution of the QBER.
810nm (Thorlabs P1-830A-FC) connecting Alice and Bob. Before every test the
fiber was aligned using polarization control pads (Thorlabs FPC-560) so that any
polarization input state exits almost unchanged [the fibers proved to remain stable
for quite long periods (∼ 4h), enough for several runs after the alignment]. The
second stage is at Alice’s side. The switch between CM and MM is passively
realized via a 50/50 BS. Control Mode: The photons are polarization analyzed by
a set composed by a λ/2-waveplate (WP2), a polarizing BS (PBS2) and two APD
(PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR-13-FC) modules with quantum efficiency ηB ∼ 50% at
810nm and dark counts ∼ 300cps (A0 and A1). The counts rates are measured in
a 8ns time window triggered by the sync source, giving a dark counts per gating
windows dB ∼ 2.4× 10−6. To complete the control mode, Alice injects in the BS,
used for switching from CM to MM, a light pulse generated by the second half of
the pulse originated from the diode laser. The pulses are polarization encoded in
similar fashion as at Bob’s side (P2), and attenuated to a mean photon number
per pulse almost 1/20 of the MM one [27]. A couple of λ/2 waveplates (WP2,3)
are used to realize the I and the iσ̂y operators necessary for the Message Mode [5].
As last step, the photon travels back to Bob through a different fiber, 5m long too,
with a polarization control pads.
The photons coming from Alice are eventually polarization-analyzed at Bob’s
side by PBS3 and a λ/2 waveplate (WP4) set so that the photons are measured in
the same basis as they were prepared. The photons are collected after the PBS3
into two multimode fibers and then detected by two APD modules, B0 and B1.
Counts out of B0 and B1 in a 8ns time window triggered to the sync source, can
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be associated to logical values ‘0’ and ‘1’ corresponding to Alice encoding in the
MM runs. A typical result of a communication test is reported in the inset of Fig.3
for different state preparations performed by Bob and different encodings by Alice
(all the eight configurations of interest).
In our experimental tests we estimated the total QBER as e = n˜err/ntot, where
ntot is the total number of counts and n˜err the counts in the ‘wrong’ detector. The
best value we obtained for e is (0.0248± 0.0001). We have estimated a probability
of ‘ambiguous’ double clicks nD/ntot ∼ 9 × 10−4, a factor ∼ 30 lower than the
probability of error bits e, i.e. we can approximate n˜error ∼ nerr (see discussion
before Fig. 2). The channel transmissivity is estimated to be tlink ∼ 0.27 giving
Γc ∼ 5.7dB. These parameters allow to estimate the ‘secure bits gain’, Gsec, for
LM05 and BB84 to be 0.018 and 0.006, respectively. With a 20MHz repetition
rate laser this entails the possibility to distribute secret bits with LM05 at ∼ 360
kbits/s, 3 times higher than BB84 (∼ 120 kbits/s). The mean photon number
used in the experiment represents the optimal µ for distances up to ∼ 3 Km.
4. Conclusion
Our study shows the security of the LM05 protocol against a class of PNS
attacks, based on imperfections of Alice and Bob’s equipment. As a byproduct
we found that LM05 allows for higher distribution rates of secure bits respect to
the BB84, for almost all the relevant distances between Alice and Bob. In our
analysis we made the implicit assumption that Eve is clever enough not to alter
the statistics of the losses counted by Alice and Bob [32]. This means that in
the frame of PNSM attacks Eve should distribute her ‘blocking action’ on both
the paths (to and fro) between Alice and Bob, otherwise resulting more easily
detectable.
Furthermore we have reported on the first experimental test of LM05 imple-
mented with weak coherent state at 0.8µm. We have measured a QBER e ∼ 0.024
for a communication distance of 5m, which for the parameters of our setup allows
for a secure bit rate ∼ 3 times higher than BB84 for distances up to ∼ 3 Km.
This work has been supported by the European Commission through the Inte-
grated Project ‘Scalable Quantum Computing with Light and Atoms’ (SCALA),
Contract No 015714, ‘Qubit Applications’ (QAP), Contract No 015848, funded
by the IST directorate, and the Ministero della Istruzione, dellUniversita´ e della
Ricerca ((FIRB-RBAU01L5AZ and PRIN-2005024254)).
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